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The Article first locates the modernization of European Community antitrust enforcement
within the context of the regulatory state and the Lisbon agenda before turning to the debates
on new governance. It then specifically analyzes the emergence of networks in general and the
European Competition Network in particular before concluding.
REGULATION AND MODES OF
GOVERNANCE IN EC COMPETITION LAW:
WHAT'S NEW IN ENFORCEMENT?
Imelda Maher*
INTRODUCTION
European Community ("EC") competition law is long estab-
lished, but has undergone a ten year period of reform that is
nearing completion. Reform has addressed both substantive is-
sues (such as the extent to which vertical agreements fall within
the competition rules,' state aids,2 mergers,' and currently the
scope of the prohibition on abuse of market dominance4 ) and
enforcement. The focus of this Article is on enforcement and,
specifically, on one of the most distinctive features of the re-
formed institutional architecture-the European Competition
Network ("ECN") which consists of competition enforcement of-
ficials from the EC Commission and the Member States.5 The
Network arises out of the decentralized enforcement of the EC
antitrust rules6 with national competition authorities ("NCAs")
* Sutherland Professor of European Law, UCD School of Law and Dublin Euro-
pean Institute, Dublin.
1. See generally Commission Regulation No. 2790/99, O.J. L 336/21 (1999); Com-
mission Regulation No. 1790/99, O.J. L 213/18 (1999); ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN,
EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007); FRANK WIJCKMANS,
FILIP Tuxrsc-tAEVER & ALAIN VANDERELST, VERTICAL AGREEMENTS IN EC COMPETITION
LAw (2005). Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Law and Society Asso-
ciation of 2007 conference, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany; the Europa Insti-
tute, University of Edinburgh as part of its seminar series "The Treaty of Rome: The
50th Anniversary" and at a University of Glasgow School of Law staff seminar. Thanks
to participants and Colin Scott for helpful comments.
2. See generally Commission of the European Communities, State Aid Action Plan:
Less and Better Targeted State Aid: A Roadmap for State Aid Reform 2005-2009, COM
(2005) 107 Final (June 7, 2005).
3. Council Regulation No. 139/2004, O.J. L 24/1 (2004).
4. See Directorate General ("DG") for Competition discussion paper on the appli-
cation of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses (Dec. 2005), http://ec.europa.
eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf. For commentary see Wolf-
gang Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 EC Treaty in the Light of the Economic Approach, in
ART. 82 EC: NEW INTERPRETATIONS, NEW ENFORCEMEN" MECHANISMS Uosef Dreal et al.
eds., forthcoming 2008).
5. Council Regulation No. 1/03, recitals 15-18, arts. 11, 12, OJ. L 1, at 4, 10-11
(2002) [hereinafter Reg. 1].
6. The term "antitrust law" will be used here to refer to Articles 81 and 82 EC,
which prohibit restrictive agreements and abuse of market dominance.
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and national courts7 now having competence to enforce the anti-
trust rules in their entirety.' Shared competence immediately
raises questions of jurisdiction: under what conditions does any
particular competition authority assume jurisdiction under the
EC rules? This question is inadequately answered by Regulation
1 itself with the ECN the forum created to address the allocation
of cases, the sharing of (confidential) information and discus-
sions as to policy development. This Article analyzes the ECN
through the lens of the governance literature in European Stud-
ies and International Relations where the emergence of govern-
mental networks is recognized as one of the key responses to the
twin phenomena of globalization and the fragmentation of the
state. In doing so, the Article argues that the modernization of
EC antitrust enforcement combines "old" and "new" governance
showing the transformative potential of combining different
processes.
The Article first locates the modernization of EC antitrust
enforcement within the context of the regulatory state and the
Lisbon agenda before turning to the debates on new govern-
ance. It then specifically analyzes the emergence of networks in
general and the ECN in particular before concluding.
I. THE REGULATORY TURN: AN ANALOGY
Competition law reforms have taken place in parallel with
the shift to new governance methods seen in the European
Union ("EU"). De Btrca and Scott have described "new govern-
ance" as a wide range of processes and practices that have a nor-
mative dimension, but do not operate primarily or at all through
the formal mechanism of traditional command-and-control-type
7. This Article will focus on national competition authorities ("NCA") and will not
discuss the role of national courts in European Community ("EC") competition law
enforcement.
8. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, recitals 4-8, arts. 5-6, O.J. L 1, at 1-2, 8-9
(2002). Under the previous regime the EC Commission had exclusive power to grant
exemptions to the prohibition on anticompetitive agreements. NCAs could only en-
force the prohibition and then only if they had been granted the power to do so by
their own governments. See generally Council Regulation No. 17, art. 9, O.J. L 13 (1962);
Commission Notice on Cooperation Between National Competition Authorities and
the Commission in Handling Cases Falling Within the Scope of Articles 85 or 86 of the
EC Treaty, O.J. C 313/3 (1997); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Implementation of EC Competi-
tion Law by National Anti-Trust Authorities, 17 EuR. COMP. L. REv. 88 (1996).
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legal institutions.' Command-and-control regulation is "the ex-
ercise of influence by imposing standards backed by [in some
jurisdictions] criminal sanctions."10 In essence, the coercive
force of law is used to prohibit certain conduct or to require
some positive action or to set down conditions of entry to partic-
ular sectors."1 Baldwin and Cave point to a number of concerns
that arose in relation to this traditional form of hierarchical ex-
ercise of public authority, e.g., regulatory capture where the reg-
ulator and the regulatee become too close so policy reflects the
interests of the regulatees rather than the public interest; exces-
sive legalism and over-regulation; information deficits for regula-
tors that makes standard-setting difficult; and the costs of en-
forcement of rules and uncertainty as to the effects of enforce-
ment.1 2 Because of these concerns, Baldwin and Cave note that
alternative forms of regulation have emerged such as self-regula-
tion, for example, where trade associations or professional bod-
ies set down their own standards in order to avoid state regula-
tion and incentive-based regulation, e.g., through subsidies or
tax incentives such as lower tax rates for "greener" cars. Govern-
ments can regulate through contracts as more and more of the
traditional business of government is outsourced and the private
contractual relation between a government department and con-
tractor is the key regulatory mechanism determining the con-
duct of the contractor.
Competition law and regulation can both be viewed as gov-
ernance tools, and like the shift towards new modes of regula-
tion, the modernization" of EC competition law also reflects dif-
fusion and government fragmentation. To equate competition
9. See Grdinne de Bfirca &Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and Con-
stitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Grdinne de B(irca
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
10. ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY,
STRATEGY AND PRACTICE 35 (1999).
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. The EC Commission has consistently referred to the process as one of modern-
ization rather than mere reform, perhaps to grasp the seismic scale of the institutional
and substantive changes involved. See Commission of the European Communities,
White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty, COM (99) 101 Final (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter White Paper]; see also James S.
Venit, Brave New World: The Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement under Articles
81 and 82 of the EC Teaty, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 545, 545 (2003) (referring to mod-
ernization as the "great leap forward").
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law with regulation flies in the face of conventional understand-
ing that sees them as opposites, but the analogy is appropriate
within the wider context of governance. 14 As regulation moves
away from traditional command-and-control methods the con-
ceptual divide between competition and regulation also weakens
with competition laws used in conjunction with regulation to sus-
tain levels of competition so as to underpin the standards set, for
example, in relation to service provision in a sector. Given this
shift, it is not surprising to see changes in competition law re-
flecting wider changes in governance and regulation.
It is enlightening to cast the modernization of the EC com-
petition rules within this framework. The competition reforms
occurred within the traditional governance structures of the EC.
It was a radical turn for competition law. "Throwing out" Regu-
lation 17, one of the oldest statutes in the EC, was largely a heret-
ical notion if ever even articulated until the mid-1990s. None-
theless, the system that operated under the Regulation was
faulty. It was highly interventionist and centralized (and ineffi-
cient) with a system of notifying agreements to the Commis-
sion. 15 This was replaced by self-regulation and has been accom-
panied by an increased use of sanctions-manifest by recent
huge fines in, e.g., the lift manufacturers' cartel case, 16 strength-
14. Julia Black defines regulation as "the intentional activity of attempting to con-
trol, order or influence the behaviour of others." Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regu-
lation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2002). Competition law, on the other hand, is con-
cerned with the maximization of consumer welfare through the promotion of competi-
tion by enabling the market to operate as freely as possible. Thus, regulation tends to
be equated with control (including price controls) of specific domains (e.g., communi-
cations, energy markets) where markets cannot operate fully due to public interest re-
quirements such as universal service while competition is generic and prohibits, rather
than demands, specific behavior or positive obligations. These distinctions are rein-
forced by institutional characteristics where regulators are sectoral and exist in conjunc-
tion with competition agencies that apply general competition rules. See generally
Imelda Maher, Regulating Competition, in REGULATING LAw 187 (Christine Parker et al.
eds., 2004).
15. See generally David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community Competi-
tion Law?, 35 HARV. I-r'L L.J. 97 (1964); STEPHEN WILYs, Agency Escape: Decentralization or
Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?, 18 Gov-
ERNANCE 431-52 (2005) (providing a more critical assessment of the seriousness of the
burden of notification).
16. See generally Commission Decision Summary No. 2008/C75/10, O.J. C 75/19
(2007) (imposing fines just under one billion Euros on an elevator cartel). The deci-
sion is currently under appeal. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, art. 12, O.J. L 1, at 11
(2002); see generally Commission Notice, O.J. C 155/27 (2007); Commission Notice,
O.J. C 140/39 (2007).
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ened leniency programs for whistle-blowers,17 and an extensive
debate on increasing private enforcement. 8 More fundamen-
tally, authority has been decentered to the national level and
across agencies and courts with enforcement risks (and costs)
spread more.
Modernization of antitrust enforcement in the EU has had
three main dimensions. First, and discussed at greater length
below, enforcement has been decentralized to the national level
strengthening the previously weak multi-level governance nature
of antitrust law in the EC. Competence is now shared between
NCAs and the EC Commission19 for the enforcement of the EC
competition rules. Second, this is supplemented by a shift to-
wards self-regulation by undertakings2 ° in relation to their com-
pliance with the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements.
Under Article 81, agreements that fall within the prohibition are
only exempt if they meet the four cumulative, stringent and nar-
rowly construed criteria set out in Article 81(3) .21 Historically,
only the Commission could grant an exemption through a notifi-
17. Commission Notice, O.J. C 298/17 (2006).
18. See generally Commission of the European Union: White Paper on Damages
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules Brussels 2 April 2008 COM (2008) 165
final and accompanying Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2008) 404 both availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.
html (last visited June 3, 2008). Francisco Marcos & Albert Snchez Graells, Towards a
European Tort Law? Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules: harmonising
Tort Law through the back door?, (Oct. 25-26, 2007) (presented at IV Int'l Congress,
European Private Law Beyond the CFR, Leida, Spain), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1028963.
19. Formal decisions in individual cases both before and after reform are taken by
the entire College of Commissioners with day-to-day operations carried out by DG Com-
petition ("DGComp"). See generally Stephen Wilks & Lee McGowan, Competition Policy in
the European Union: Creating a Federal Agency ?, in COMPARATIVE COMPETITION POLICY. NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN A GLOBAL MARKET 225-67 (G. Bruce Doern & Stephen Wilks
eds., 1996).
20. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
arts. 81, 82, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 73-75 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Articles 81 and
82 EC apply to "undertakings," which is a term of art that has been very widely inter-
preted by the European Courts. See Victoria Louri, "Undertaking" as a Jurisdictional Ele-
ment for the Application of EC Competition Rules, 29 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION
143-76 (2002).
21. Under Article 81(3), the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements will apply
to an agreement:
[W]hich contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the under-
takings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment
2008] 1717
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cation system characterized by an ever-increasing backlog of no-
tified agreements.2 Commission resources were directed to-
wards reviewing innocuous agreements rather than tackling
more serious issues such as cartels. The re-deployment of Com-
mission resources to ensure more effective enforcement of EC
competition law required the abolition of the notification sys-
tem. Undertakings now evaluate their agreements in light of Ar-
ticle 81 in its entirety and decide whether the agreement falls
within the provision at all and, if it does, whether or not it can
qualify for exemption.
Thus the old, excessively legalized, highly interventionist sys-
tem of notification where the Commission controlled (in theory
at least) the extent to which agreements could be exempt under
EC law, has been replaced by a form of self-regulation where
firms must evaluate for themselves the extent to which they are
antitrust compliant. Such self-evaluation occurs in the shadow of
the law with the potentially significant consequences of failing to
do so correctly: the agreement is void and hence unenforce-
able;" the undertakings could be subject to large fines;2 4 in
some Member States, individuals could be subject to criminal
fines and imprisonment or could be banned from holding direc-
torships for up to five years;2 and/or the undertakings could be
at risk of private actions for damages being taken against them. 6
Thus, under the new competition regime, responsibility for com-
of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
EC Treaty, supra note 20, art. 81(3), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 74.
22. See generally David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community Competi-
tion Law?, 35 HARv. INT'L L.J. 97 (1994); Stephen Wilks, Agency Escape: Decentralization or
Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?, 18 Gov-
ERNANCE 431-52 (2005).
23. See EC Treaty, supra note 20, art. 81(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 74.
24. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, arts. 5, 23, O.J. L 1, at 8-9, 16-17 (2002).
25. There is no harmonization of remedies for breach of EC competition rules.
For an outline see Imelda Maher, Networking Competition Authorities in the European
Union: Diversity and Change, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2002: CONSTRUCT-
ING THE EU NETWORK OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, 223-36 (2005); Tim Jones, RIegula-
tion 17: The Impact of the Current Application of Articles 81 and 82 by National Competition
Authorities on the European Commission's Proposal for Reform, 22 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 405-15
(2001); EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK, ECN WORKING GROUP ON COOPERATION IS-
SUES: RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE REFORM OF MEMBER STATES (MS) NA-
TIONAL COMPETITION LAWS AFTER EC REGULATION No. 1/2003 (2007), available at http:/
/ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/ecnsconvergencequest_28112007.pdf.
26. See generally White Paper, supra note 18.
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pliance is more firmly placed with those subject to the prohibi-
tions, while the risk of detection is increased through the compe-
tence of NCAs to enforce the EC rules.
The move to self-review was justified by the fact there were
thirty-five years of precedent on which undertakings could rely.
27
The Commission monopoly on the award of exemptions has
therefore been removed. NCAs and national courts can now
evaluate an agreement in light of all of Article 81 as Article
81(3), under which exemptions can be granted, is now directly
applicable within the domestic legal order.28 The abolition of
notification has changed the "learning-by-reviewing" process of
the Commission in advance of the introduction of a block ex-
emption. 29 One of the unintended consequences of the shift to-
wards self-regulation is that the Commission no longer has the
notification system to provide it with information about the na-
ture of agreements in the EU. Instead, it now has the power to
conduct investigations into sectors of the economy and particu-
lar types of agreements.30 Thus, it must now be proactive in its
gathering of information, rather than being the passive recipient
of information provided by undertakings. In addition, a key
function of the ECN is information sharing, including the shar-
ing of confidential information."1
Third, and closely allied to the second dimension of mod-
ernization, the approach of the Commission to vertical agree-
ments (i.e., distribution) changed at the same time as moderni-
zation was first mooted. The Commission has the power to enact
regulations exempting categories of agreements from Article
81.32 These agreements were highly formalized-in effect im-
posing standard form contracts as they were very narrowly
drawn, reflecting a cautious and highly legalized Commission. 3
27. See White Paper, supra note 13, 48.
28. See generally Council Regulation No. 1/03 O.J. L 1 (2002).
29. See Imelda Maher, Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Evolving For-
malism, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 597-624 (Paul Craig & Gr-,inne de Btrca eds.,
1999).
30. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, art. 17, OJ. L 1, at 13 (2002).
31. See id. arts. 12, 23, O.J. L 1, at 11, 16-17 (2002).
32. See id. recital 10, OJ. L 1, at 3 (2002).
33. See Council Regulation No. 19/65, 8J.O. 533, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-66, at
35. For a discussion of the rigid effect of the regulations, see Jean-Eric de Cockborne,
Franchising and EC Competition Law, in FRANCHISING AND THE LAw: THEORETICAL AND
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 281, 287 (Christian
Joerges ed., 1991).
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Vertical agreements were controversially seen as often anti-com-
petitive given their capacity to restrict cross-border trade (and
competition).34 After the completion of the single market pro-
gram, the need for an integrationist competition policy that de-
fied the standard economic understanding of consumer welfare
was no longer apparent. A less restrictive approach was adopted
in the revised vertical agreements block exemption.35 This revi-
sion, with its more broad brush approach, is less interventionist
and increases the margin of discretion for undertakings. This
reform, carried out within the existing powers of the Commis-
sion and not requiring the level of reform found in Regulation
1, is indicative of the extent to which the Commission and Direc-
torate General for Competition ("DGComp") in particular was
internally differentiated, with the reforms as the result of a pro-
cess of internal negotiation and conflict. 6
The high costs of the old regime have been addressed.
These costs were practical, (e.g., in relation to the cost of review-
ing notified agreements) and reputational, with the back-log of
agreements and perceived over-regulation, in particular of verti-
cal agreements undermining the credibility of the competition
regime. The misallocation of resources to relatively trivial agree-
ments in the notification system also undermined the credibility
of the EC competition regime in general and the Commission in
particular as more serious issues, such as cartels, could not be
properly addressed. Thus, the over-regulation that character-
ized both the notification system and the block exemption re-
gime was swept aside with a move to enforced self-regulation and
decentralized enforcement.
II. COMPETITION MODERNIZATION AND "LISBON"
Governance can be understood as the diffusion and frag-
mentation of governmental arrangements, which in this context
is exemplified by the multi-level governance structures of the
EU. In the last decade there has been much debate about the
34. See generally Barry E. Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition
Law, 32 COMMON MK-r. L. REV. 973 (1995).
35. See generally Commission Regulation No. 2790/99, O.J. L 336/21 (1999).
36. See generally Hussein Kassim & Kathryn Wright, Revisiting Modernisation: The Eu-
ropean Commission, Policy Change and the Reform of EC Competition Policy (Centre for Com-
petition Policy, Working Paper 07-19, 2007), available at http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/
publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP07-19.pdf.
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nature of new governance in the EU. De Bdirca and Scott warn
against taking the moniker "new governance" too literally, as
what is new in one policy field may well turn out to be well-estab-
lished in others.3 7 New governance in European Studies is asso-
ciated most closely with the Lisbon agenda and the spur that that
policy initiative gave to academic and policy debates about the
nature of governance in the EU.38 The Lisbon agenda arose out
of the European Council summit meeting in March 2000, in an-
ticipation of the start of the Economic and Monetary Union.
The Council committed to the EU becoming "the most competi-
tive knowledge based economy in the world, capable of sustaina-
ble economic growth with more and better jobs and greater so-
cial cohesion" and environmental protection by 2010."9 The
governance tool identified as the key mechanism for the realiza-
tion of this objective was the open method of coordination
("OMC") which draws on the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration Development ("OECD") practice of benchmarking,
monitoring and peer review, in order to facilitate lesson-learning
and ultimately change in governance or policy.4" The method is
different from the classic Monnet method where a proposal
from the Commission may ultimately culminate in binding legis-
lation, usually either in the form of a Directive (binding only as
to outcome) or Regulation (binding in its entirety and directly
applicable at the national level throughout the EU).1 It is pred-
icated on a principle of information gathering and sharing, and
evaluation according to agreed benchmarks. Thus, there is a
top-down and bottom-up dimension to this method, with Mem-
ber State officials providing the information in the light of
37. See De Bfirca & Scott, supra note 9, at 3; see generally Kenneth Armstrong &
Claire Kilpatrick, Law, Governance, or New Governance? The Changing Open Method of Coor-
dination, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 649 (2007).
38. See, e.g., THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION IN ACTION: THE EUROPEAN EM-
PLOYMENT AND SOCIAL INCLUSION STRATEGIES, Uonathan Zeitlin et al. eds., Brussels
2005); Dermot Hodson & Imelda Maher, The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance:
The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination, 39J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 719 (2001); see
also David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social
Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination, 11 EUR. L.J. 343 (2005).
39. Lisbon European Council Press Release, 100/1/00 (Mar. 23, 2000); seegenerally
G6teborg European Council Press Release, 200/1/01 Uune 15, 2001).
40. See generally Armin Schafer, A New Form of Governance? Comparing the Open
Method of Co-ordination to Multilateral Surveillance by the IMF and OECD, 13 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'V 70 (2006).
41. See generally id.
17212008]
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guidelines and benchmarks set at the European level, but the
process remains open as to outcome. This is a stylized descrip-
tion as there is considerable variation in different policy fields as
to how the method works. The openness of the method as to
outcome, the very ambitious objective, tight deadline and per-
haps, most significantly, a marked downturn in the European
economy in general and the German economy in particular at
the start of 1990s, meant that the Lisbon agenda almost immedi-
ately ran into difficulties.4 2 Now, the deadline is no longer seen
as significant (or realizable), and there is much debate about
how new the governance tool is and the extent to which it is
different from and is a "threat" to existing governance struc-
tures-either institutionally, substantively, functionally or for-
mally.44 It is no longer seen as landmark in the same way as
some other major initiatives were in the EU such as "1992" and
Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU") mainly because of the
uncertainty of identifying clear, firm outcomes that can be di-
rectly associated with Lisbon.45
The antitrust reform agenda within DGComp pre-dated Lis-
bon by a year and operated separately from it. Lisbon is associ-
ated with new governance, while competition policy (more spe-
cifically antitrust enforcement) has long established roots in
traditional forms of EC law and decision-making.4 6 The Com-
mission has long enjoyed far-ranging powers of enforcement
conferred on it by the Member States and has increased those
powers over time, for example, the Commission became respon-
sible for evaluating EC mergers in 1989 and, while there were
suggestions that there should be a separate and independent Eu-
ropean Competition Office in the mid-1990s,4 7 ultimately, the
42. See, e.g., Jean Pisani-Ferry, Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Critical Retrospective on
the Debate Over the Economic Governance of the Euro Area, 44J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 823
(2006).
43. See generally THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, FACING THE CHALLENGE: THE LISBON
STRATEGY FOR GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT (2004), http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/
pdf/kok-reporten.pdf.
44. See, e.g., NEW GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE US
(Grdinne De Bgrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
45. Cf COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TIME TO MOVE UP A GEAR:
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S 2006 ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT ON GROWTH AND JOBS
(2006), http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/illustrated-version-en.pdf
46. See generally Armstrong & Kilpatrick, supra note 37.
47. See generally Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflections on a European Cartel Office, 32
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 471 (1995).
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Commission has remained the key actor in EC competition law.
Competence is shared with the Member States in two different
ways. First, every Member State has its own competition laws-
many of them modelled on the EC norms4 8-and now desig-
nated NCAs can enforce the EC rules also. There is a clear and
long-articulated role for EC competition law within the EU and
for the EC Commission. Despite this long pedigree, at the heart
of the EC, soft law, now associated with new governance, has in
fact been a feature of competition law since the 1960s. With re-
form, it has introduced a key new governance technique-the
Network-and in doing so has emphasized the hybrid nature of
competition law. While the Network may be new in this particu-
lar sphere, as the Lisbon experience and the wider academic de-
bates show, the emergence of the Network reflects a wider phe-
nomenon in Europe and beyond. Thus, modernization of EC
competition law allows us to question the novelty of what is hap-
pening in the competition sphere given developments else-
where, while at the same time acknowledging the extent to
which these reforms are indeed radical within this particular
field and highlighting the extent to which notions of new-ness
and novelty in relation to governance should be treated with
great caution.
III. NEW? GOVERNANCE
Treib, Bdihr, and Falkner see governance as a spectrum re-
flecting the intensity of state/polity intervention, with hierarchi-
cal government backed by coercive sanctions at one end and
self-regulation at the other.49 The novelty, or otherwise, of gov-
ernance is not of significance. Trubek and Trubek call emerg-
ing processes "new governance" which have the capacity to en-
courage experimentation, employ stakeholder participation to
devise solutions, rely on broad framework agreements which
have flexible and revisable standards and use benchmarks, in-
48. See generally Imelda Maher, Alignment of Competition Laws in the EC, 16 Y.B. EUR.
L. 223 (1996); see generally MICHAELA DRAHOS, CONVERGENCE OF COMPETITION LAWS AND
POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (2001).
49. See Oliver Treib et al., Modes of Governance: A Note Towards Conceptual Clarifica-
tion European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. N-05-02 (2005), available at http:/
/www.con nex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-n ewgov-N-05-02.pdf.
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dicators and peer review to ensure accountability.5° They sug-
gest that the use of the term "new" does not necessarily mean
that the techniques under discussion are recent. 51 What is new
is that the use of these approaches is regularized and self-con-
scious as an alternative or supplement to traditional forms. It is
in this sense that the term new governance is discussed here.
Armstrong and Kilpatrick point to six themes in the literature on
new governance.5 2 New governance is defined as what is not old
governance (though the label "old" is never used). In the con-
text of the EU, this is often about comparing new governance to
the Monnet method. A second theme relates to the increasing
involvement of private actors in governance. The tools and in-
struments used are also seen as indicative of newness with regula-
tions and directives associated with traditional EU governance
and framework directives and the OMC seen as new. In discuss-
ing different modes of governance, Armstrong and Kilpatrick
note the risk of conflating instrument with mode so that, for ex-
ample, legislation becomes equated with hierarchy as a mode of
governance. It may be possible for an instrument to be the
product of different governance modes.53 Thus in the competi-
tion domain the shift to networked governance-a classic instru-
ment of new governance-was institutionalized through a regu-
lation-the most hierarchical and traditional governance tool in
the EC.
What is a mode of governance? Armstrong and Kilpatrick
note that several classifications have emerged. 54 Scott's four-fold
classification of governance as hierarchy, community, market
and design is indicative of this abstraction.55 Hierarchy is usually
associated with traditional forms of governance-where the
threat of sanction is used to secure a change in conduct. Com-
50. See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 541 (2007).
51. See id. at 543 n.9.
52. See Armstrong & Kilpatrick, supra note 37, at 652-55.
53. See id. at 654.
54. See id.; see generally Treib et al., supra note 49.
55. See Colin Scott, The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-Level
Control, 8 EUR. L.J. 59, 64-65 (2002); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a "Dense Com-
plexity": Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, ISSuES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP art.
4 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4/ (discussing the first three
categories as accountability regimes). Given that accountability is one aspect of govern-
ance, the sub-classification in relation to accountability is consistent with the wider ab-
straction of governance. Id.
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munity as a governance mode emphasizes peer esteem and the
concomitant pressure that comes with that, such as, governance
through networks which internally generate their own reciprocal
obligations. Market or competition as a mode of governance
looks primarily to outcomes-has the policy objective been real-
ized? The EU with its historic use of objectives and deadlines
has made use of this mode, although the redefining of the Lis-
bon agenda and the abandonment of the deadline points to the
problems of adopting such a mode. Finally, design as a mode of
governance is found most often in regulation literatures con-
cerned with enforcement, e.g., the use of bollards to prevent ille-
gal parking. Treib, Bahr and Falkner, in their discussion of
modes of governance with reference to institutions, identify the
same classification as Scott (but for governance by design).56
They also regard as significant the extent to which authority is
dispersed and the degree of institutionalisation of decision-mak-
ing. 57
The fifth theme identified by Armstrong and Kilpatrick is
governance attributes. They mention six identified by Scott and
Trubek: participation and power-sharing; multi-level integra-
tion; diversity and decentralization; deliberation; flexibility and
revisability; and experimentation and knowledge-creation.58
Armstrong and Kilpatrick warn of the risk of slippage in analysis
when seeking to evaluate a governance mode in light of these
attributes.59 In particular, it is not clear if compliance with the
list is desirable or how such compliance could be measured.
The list is also not exhaustive, which limits its value as a bench-
mark. This can be contrasted with the final theme of govern-
ance architecture6" which, unlike the list approach of Scott and
Trubek, is more prescriptive. Armstrong and Kilpatrick's analy-
sis shows the difficulty of separating out themes and the ten-
dency towards normative analysis: the provision of ideal-types of
governance against which to measure the particular forms of
governance being scrutinized. The problem with such a norma-
tive analysis is that it tells us little of intrinsic value: whether gov-
56. See Treib et al., supra note 49, at 8-9.
57. See id. at 9.
58. SeeJoanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to
Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2002).
59. See Armstrong & Kilpatrick, supra note 37, at 654.
60. See id. at 658 n.32.
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ernance is new. It is only useful if it challenges claims of novelty
in particular spheres so governance innovations can be located
within the context of fragmenting, multi-level polity and within
theoretical and policy debates that shed light on the effective-
ness and legitimacy of particular modes of governance.
Treib, Bahr, and Falkner provide an overview of modes of
governance that may be used to analyze changes in the way the
EU is trying to achieve its different policy objectives.61 They
identify three categories of analysis through which scholars have
explored governance: actors, institutions and policy.62 The au-
thors provide an overview of existing conceptions of modes of
governance within each of these three categories with the inten-
sity of each attribute reflecting the intensity of state intervention
in society.6 3 Their typologies within the policy and institutions
modes are most useful for the purposes of our analysis of anti-
trust enforcement.
64
They identify five modes: law (hard or soft), sanction,
norms (fixed or malleable), implementation (how flexible?),
and standards (substantive or procedural). First, the extent to
which soft law mechanisms are used is an important indicator of
the intensity of state/EU intervention. Soft laws are rules of con-
duct which in principle have no legally binding force, but never-
theless can have practical effects. 65 This can be contrasted with
legal binding-ness of hard law or legalization, characterized by
Abbott et al. as the intensity of obligation, precision and delega-
tion (of interpretation).66 Finnemore and Toope provide a con-
structivist critique of this definition noting the vagueness of the
notion of obligation and the largely positivist conception of the
law. These criticisms are well made, but the failure to evaluate
the significance and nature of sanction as a dimension of legali-
zation is a significant omission. 67 While Treib, Bdihr, and
61. See generally Treib et al., supra note 49.
62. See id. at 7-11.
63. See id.
64. The actor mode is primarily concerned with the extent to which private actors
are involved in governance-an issue not addressed in this Article. See id.
65. Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions,
Processes, Tools and Techniques, in IMPLEMENTING EC LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: STRUC-
TURES FOR INDIRECT RULE 64 (Terence Daintith ed., 1995).
66. See Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 IN"r'L ORG. 401, 401-02 (2000).
This appears in a special issue of the Journal devoted to hard and soft law.
67. See Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer
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Falkner refer to the fixed or malleable nature of norms as an-
other mode of governance it is not clear to what extent this dif-
fers from soft law, especially if adopting Abbott et al.'s definition
of legalization. Treib, Bdhr, and Falkner do see sanction as rele-
vant to the intensity of state/EU intervention.6" There is much
debate in the literature (e.g., Bovens, 69 Harlow, 70 Rawlings, and
Harlow71 ) about the effectiveness of sanction, the extent to
which it can limit ownership of a policy through the externaliza-
tion of obligation and responsibility (Rawlings and Harlow) and
the fact that sanction tends to carry with it a legal connotation
that fails to grasp the wider notion of "consequence." Such con-
sequences may have little, in fact, to do with legal binding-ness
and a lot to do with exclusion, peer pressure and other less tan-
gible, but sometimes effective consequences (Bovens).
Implementation and standards are closely linked to each
other. The greater the flexibility allowed in implementation the
less strong intervention there is by the state/polity. Thus, the
EC directive, with the freedom it allows to states as to methods
(while binding as to outcome), provides greater flexibility than
the regulation (binding in its entirety). There is a huge scope
for flexibility in enforcement (one dimension of implementa-
tion) of antitrust law as there is no harmonization of procedures
or sanctions used by NCAs when giving effect to the EC rules.
The extent to which material or procedural standards are cho-
sen also reflects the intensity of state/EU intervention. For ex-
ample, the use of safe harbor clauses in EC competition law
Views of Law and Politics, 55 INT'L ORG. 743, 743-58 (2001); Dermot Hodson & Imelda
Maher, Soft Law and Sanctions: Economic Policy Coordination and Reform of the Stability and
Growth Pact, I1 J. EUR. PUB. POLICY 806, 806-21 (2004) (regarding sanctions). For an
overview, see David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, "Soft Law," "Hard Law"
and EU Integration, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, 65-94
(Grhinne de Btirca &Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
68. See Treib et al., supra note 53, at 8.
69. See Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual
Framework (European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. C-06-01, 2006), available at
http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-01.pdf; Imelda
Maher, Economic Governance: Hybidity, Accountability, and Control, 13(3) COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 679, 688-93.
70. See generally CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002).
71. See Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Promoting Accountability in Multi-Level
Governance: A Network Approach (European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. C-06-
01, 2006), available at http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-
02.pdf; Imelda Maher, Economic Governance: Hybridity, Accountability, and Control, 13(3)
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 679, 688-93.
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removes public oversight below the threshold. 72 Where it is im-
practical to set substantive standards, procedural devices are
used instead to achieve particular policy goals, for example, the
use of transparency as a means of preventing cross-subsidization
by firms that previously enjoyed state monopolies between their
business in protected markets and competitive markets. 73 Treib,
Bihr, and Falkner go on to provide a typology of modes of gov-
ernance based on two axes: the extent to which hard or soft law
is evident and the flexibility within implementation. Soft law is a
hallmark of new governance, but has had a long history in com-
petition law. Understanding what constitutes soft law is central
to an analysis of governance methods in this sphere.
TV. COMPETITION AND SOFT LAW
A hallmark of EC antitrust enforcement from the earliest
days has been the use of soft law instruments.7 4 Their preva-
lence in this highly juridified field shows how "newness" per se
limits governance analysis. What matters is both the fact that the
adoption of soft law is more self-consciously done within the con-
text of the political and academic debates on new governance
and the intensity of soft law instruments, rather than their pres-
ence per se in a policy field. Trubek, Cottrell, and Nance com-
pare and contrast constructivist and rationalist accounts of soft
law before discussing the hybridity of law.75 They note how ra-
tionalist accounts suggest that soft law is a way out for Member
States unable for whatever reason to make certain decisions. 76
Soft law gets around an impasse that the detailed obligation and
precision associated with hard law renders impossible. Construc-
tivist accounts, on the other hand, see soft law as a tool for ulti-
mately facilitating the difficult choices that are being deferred.
They suggest the two perspectives can be integrated. 77 Thus, ra-
tionalist accounts may help explain why soft law became the pre-
72. See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 2790/99, art. 2(4), 3 0J. L 336/21, at 23
(1999).
73. See, e.g., Council Directive No. 97/67/EC, O.J. L 15 (1998) (referring to postal
services).
74. See Hikon A. Cosma & Richard Whish, Soft Law in the Field of EU Competition
Policy, 14 EUR. Bus. L. REv. 125, 125-52 (2003).
75. See Trubek, Cottrell & Nance, supra note 67.
76. See generally id.
77. See id. at 91.
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ferred option, while constructivist accounts, with their emphasis
on "becoming," are better at explaining how soft law works, in
particular how it works through networks.
Hybridity-where hard and soft law are merged-may be a
positive choice or the consequence of overlapping and comple-
mentary fields of action. 7' Given the complexity of EU govern-
ance that arises from the fragmentation of government and com-
pounded by the issue of competence that becomes more com-
plex due to the multi-level nature of governance and the varying
strength of obligation and responsibility for the governmental
actors in treaties, we should expect hybridity. Perhaps the ques-
tion is not whether this is new, but how long it has been around.
De Btrca and Scott refine this notion of hybridity into three
categories. 79 (1) Baseline-where new governance is largely
complementary to traditional forms of law-the two modes op-
erate in parallel but largely without much interaction (e.g., in
relation to race where the action plans and the agency seem to
operate more or less independently of the race discrimination
directive) ."o (2) Instrumental hybridity-where new governance
is a means for developing existing legal norms-a form of what
Trubek and Trubek call "complementarity. '8 Thus new govern-
ance methods are used to complement existing legal frameworks
such that one form is used to launch the other or they can oper-
ate independently yet have an effect on the same policy domain.
(3) Default hybridity-governance in the shadow of law-a legal
regime will be triggered where coordination/compliance does
not occur.8 2 The boundaries between these categories are diffi-
cult to draw. Therefore, it is perhaps more useful to think of
Trubek and Trubek's discussion of hybridity where they point to
tensions between the old and new and to rivalries between them
where there is a choice as to which process to implement. Alter-
natively, one can take over the field and identify the largely spec-
ulative, but interesting idea of transformative rivalry for law and
governance." This arises where the rivalry between law and new
governance leads to the transformation of one or both and
78. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 50, at 544.
79. See De BtIrca & Scott, supra note 9, at 11.
80. See id. at 12.
81. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 50, at 544.
82. See De Btrca & Scott, supra note 9, at 15.
83. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 50, at 544.
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hence to a hybrid. Finally, they suggest that where law and new
forms operate together in a hybrid form, then this may lead to
transformation in the law. The two processes can be integrated
creating a new form of law. There are several possibilities dis-
cussed:8 4 law creates new governance procedures; new govern-
ance solves problems with law providing a safety net; law creates
minimum standards, and new governance processes can apply
above that; or law provides general norms and these are concre-
tized through new governance processes.8 5
What we see emerging in the competition sphere is an in-
creasing hybridity in the law. Several modes of governance have
been introduced: a decentering of authority; the use of a net-
work and peer esteem, a high level of flexibility in implementa-
tion due to a lack of uniformity in procedures and sanctions at
the national level, and a growing emphasis on private actors
through the use of whistle-blowers, and encouragement of pri-
vate enforcement. At the same time, a Regulation remains at the
heart of the procedures, there is a large body of case law, a re-
ceived orthodoxy as to the importance of economic analysis-
competition law being perhaps unique in the legal domain in
that it cannot even be defined without reference to a discourse
beyond itself, and an important episteme of lawyers that ensures
competition law remains proceduralized, even as the emphasis
on outputs and goals increase for competition agencies.
V. NETWORKS
In her seminal work, Anne-Marie Slaughter discusses the
emergence of network governance at the supra and interna-
tional levels.8 6 She notes the definition that Keohane and Nye
provide for transgovernmental activity as "sets of direct interac-
tions among sub-units of different governments that are not con-
trolled or closely guided by the policies of the executives of
those governments"8 7 and how, through governmental networks,
officials seek to ensure that those in charge of the implementa-
tion of the law apply it in a similar manner.8 8 Thus networks
84. See id. at 548.
85. See id. at 548-49.
86. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
87. Robert Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovern mental Relations and International
Organizations, 27 WORLD POLITICs 39, 43 (1974); see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 10.
88. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 10.
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address the needs of consistency and fairness in enforcement,
both being a hallmark of even the narrowest conception of the
rule of law. While networks have been a feature of governance
for more than 100 years, Slaughter argues that the scope, range
and intensity of governmental networks have expanded and that
this expansion is what is new."9 The ECN is part of this expan-
sion in two ways: first, in that it exists as yet another transgovern-
mental network and second, that it is at the high end of intensity
given the strong legal base it has and the ability of members to
share confidential information. The ECN is best characterized
as an enforcement network which necessarily has an information
exchange function and a lesser harmonization function. ° It
also has strong vertical and horizontal dimensions, reflecting its
locus within a multi-level governance polity. Thus, it is horizon-
tal in that its members come from all the Member States and all
enjoy enforcement powers under Articles 81 and 82. It is also
vertical as the Commission is a member and as a vertical network
it "pierces the shell of state sovereignty by making individual gov-
ernment institutions responsible for the implementation"'" of
the supranational EC rules. Slaughter suggests that vertical net-
works have much greater coercive power than horizontal net-
works and can become a power base, both for the supranational
institution (in this case the Commission) and the national mem-
bers who can use their membership in the network to advance
particular agendas domestically. This dual powerbase highlights
another feature of such vertical networks: that given its locus
within multi-level governance it should not be seen as the crea-
ture of the supranational authority. Hence, the Commission can
be seen as being the first among equals. 2 Slaughter draws an
analogy with the relationship between the European and na-
tional courts where the ECJ has been subject to what at times has
been considerable counter-pressure from national supreme
89. See id. at 44.
90. For a discussion of the different kinds of networks, see id. at 131-65. See also
the discussion of the ECN in relation to Slaughter's work in Stephen Wilks, Agencies,
Networks, Discourses and the Trajectory of the European Competition Enforcement 3(2) EUR.
Comp. J. 437, 439 (2007).
91. Id. at 132.
92. See, Imelda Maher, The Rule of Law and Agency: The Case of Competition Policy 12
(International Economics Programme, Working Paper No. 06/01, 2006); see also Wilks,
supra note 22, at 445.
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courts in its interpretation of the scope of EC law.93 In short,
vertical governmental networks exercise a mixture of hard and
soft power.94
Information and access to information is an important di-
mension to the regulation of behavior. Slaughter identified in-
formation sharing as an important form of soft power,9" but it is
hybrid in nature within the ECN because of the express statutory
power to share confidential information.96 This to some extent
sets the ECN apart from many other networks without the power
to share such information. 9v Sharing of information can lead to
policy and implementation convergence-the latter being the
rationale for the ECN-though it may also lead to informed di-
vergence.9" It can encourage compliance by members who do
not want their reputation tarnished by being seen as a weak
member of the group-the socialization of the group being im-
portant. Sharing of information can encourage cooperation
which, for EC antitrust enforcement, is essential on the vertical
level (and is written into Regulation 1)," but also on the hori-
zontal level, for which there is no statutory basis other than the
general obligation of close cooperation of all the NCAs.'0
There is no statutory basis for NCA-to-NCA cooperation. Instead
all obligations are to the Commission and all rights can be
claimed from the Commission-the horizontal dynamic not be-
ing something on which the EC legislated. Thus this is an issue
where community, as a mode of governance, is most important.
Information sharing creates a sense of shared objectives which in
the context of the ECN is supported by the episteme of competi-
93. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 151; see also KARENJ. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE
SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN Eu-
ROPE 182-208 (2001) (discussing the relationship of the European and national courts).
94. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 168.
95. See id. at 169.
96. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, recitals 16, 32, O.J. L 1, at 4, 6 (2002).
97. See, e.g., Imelda Maher, Competition Law in the International Domain: Networks as a
New Form of Governance, 29 J.L. Soc'v 1, 117 (2002); see also Oliver Budzinksi, Prospects
and Limits on the Road Towards International Competition Governance 5, 11, 14 (Interna-
tional Competition Policy-Towards a Decentralised System of International Merger
Control, Draft, 2004); The International Competition Network http://www.interna-
tionalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
98. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 171.
99. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, art. 11, O.J. L 1, at 10-11 (2002) (imposing a
requirement on NCAs to share information with the Commission).
100. See id.
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tion lawyers and officials-a close network that transcends na-
tional borders with a shared vision of how competition law is to
be used to advance consumer welfare. 01 The fact that the mem-
bers all enforce the same rules and are part of the EU of course
emphasizes this sense of shared objectives and may help to de-
velop a sense of common interest within the network. Where
there is a sense of shared identity, then the network can also
provide moral support to an NCA facing challenges domesti-
cally. Given the importance of regulation, the exchange of in-
formation within the network will enhance the status of the
members who enjoy improved information flows.
There are no criteria set down in Regulation 1 for NCAs.
The test is purely a formal one: has the national government
designated an agency (or, in the Irish case, the courts) as an
NCA?1° 2 Because of the alignment of EC and national competi-
tion regimes, both substantively and institutionally, NCAs were
largely already independent of their governments (arguably the
single most important criteria for an executive agency). And
where there are discrepancies as to the nature of the indepen-
dence, this is not something that can easily be resolved through
formal, statutory criteria, independence being a multi-faceted
phenomenon. 103 In addition, the ECN itself will act as a regula-
tor of its members. Slaughter notes that once established, a net-
work not only exchanges information about their decision-mak-
ing and policies, but also information about the effectiveness
and status of the members themselves is necessarily conveyed.
Thus, reputation is shaped by and becomes relevant within the
network-even if members did not consider reputation as a fac-
tor beforehand." 4 Dehousse underlines the fact that networks
develop a community of views only when they are structured by
common rules.0 5 This structure manages interaction and
shapes expectations internally and externally and also enhances
101. See Frans van Waarden & Michaela Drahos, Courts and (Epistemic) Communities
in the Convergence of Competition Politics, 9 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 6, 913-34 (2002).
102. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, recital 35, art. 35, OJ. L 1, at 6-7, 21-22
(2002).
103. See Stephen Wilks & Ian Bartle, The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Inde-
pendent Competition Agencies, 25 W. EUR. POLITICS 148, 148-72 (2002); see generally Maher,
supra note 25.
104. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 54.
105. Renaud Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role
of European Agencies, 4J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 246, 254 (1997).
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the status of the network and its members. 1
0 6
A network like that of the ECN, concerned with enforce-
ment of shared rules, tends to be deeply pragmatic. 0 7 This
makes for efficiency in decision-making, but as can be seen from
the application of a principal-agency analysis,0 8 the delegation
of executive power raises issues of transparency and accountabil-
ity.109 Arguably the network, when applying EC law, is dealing
mainly with large corporations capable of ensuring their rights
are well-protected, i.e., power needs to be factored into a more
abstract analysis of rule of law procedural requirements. Ac-
countability, however, goes beyond those subject to the rules. As
executive agencies carrying out power delegated to them by gov-
ernments (either at the national or supra-national level), they
are also accountable to those governments. Accountability is
usually assessed through outcomes at the EU level. This is only
one measure and indeed one of the weaknesses of the EU model
is an over-reliance on outcomes as a legitimating mechanism."' 0
Slaughter suggests that national officials have to be seen as hav-
ing a dual function,"' both a domestic and transnational func-
tion-and must be accountable domestically for both functions.
In the EU context this carries extra weight given its supra-na-
tional quality, but it is not clear to what extent national report-
ing mechanisms ensure accountability for international and Eu-
ropean responsibilities, leaving a vacuum." 12
VI. GOVERNANCE OF COMPETITION
Regulation 1 is a landmark piece of legislation because it
106. Prior to the ECN there was the Association of European Authorities, which
was an informal network. See A. Vindelyn Smith-Hillman, EC Approach to Governance as
Applied to the Modernisation of Competition Policy, 18 EUR. Bus. REv. 33-49 (2006).
107. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 193; Wilks, supra note 90, at 450.
108. See Dirk Lehmkuhl, On Government, Governance and Judicial Review: The Case of
European Competition Policy 28J. PUB. PoL'v 139-59 (2008); see generally Maher, supra note
97.
109. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 219.
110. See Mark Thatcher and Alex Stone-Sweet, The Theory and Practice of Delegation to
Non-Majoritarian Institutions, 25 W. EUR. POLITICS 1, 1-22 (2002); Elizabeth C. Fisher, The
European Union in the Age of Accountability, 24 OXFORDJ.L. STUDIES 495, 495-515 (2004).
111. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 86, at 231.
112. For example, the 2007 report of the Irish Competition Authority simply notes
that it was active in three of the four of the ECN Working groups and sectoral sub-
groups. See Competition Authority, Annual Report 55 (2007) available at http://
www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/AnnualReports/AnnualReports.aspx.
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gives effect to a shift from a highly centralized system of notifica-
tion and exemption to a system of decentralized enforcement
coordinated through networks of national officials and
DGComp, with an emphasis on self-assessment, and hence self-
regulation by firms. Thus, we see a move from centralized and
highly-interventionist steering to decentered, fragmented,
networked governance where NCAs and national courts have the
power to directly implement all of Articles 81 and 82."' The
NCAs also have a legal duty to coordinate." 4 A neat solution
would have been a clear divide between national and EU compe-
tition rules-something Rodgers and Wylie advocated,' 15 but
one which proved impossible to agree upon, thus the soft law
fudge of the network-a form necessitated by political impossi-
bility, but also by functional need. The Commission could not
secure additional resources, the EC was expanding and a net-
work could secure the development of a cadre of officials accul-
turated (to a greater or lesser extent) to the values of EC compe-
tition law for which they would then become advocates in the
Member States. Thus, the network can also be seen as a forum
which can lead to effective enforcement and clearer rule articu-
lation, not just in relation to jurisdiction, but also in relation to
substantive and procedural matters with the soft nature of this
forum leading into rule-creation over time, providing clear com-
plementarity.
Regulation 1 says very little about the network, leaving the
guidelines published 6 with it to complement the formal rules,
and this in turn was complemented by a supporting joint state-
ment from the Council and Commission, as to the states' com-
mitment to the smooth running of the network."l 7 Political own-
ership of the regime becomes more important where the values
and operations of the process lie largely outside formal rules,
113. See generally Wilks, supra note 22 (providing a skeptical view of decentraliza-
tion under Regulation 1).
114. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, art. 11(1), O.J. L 1, at 10 (2002).
115. See generally Barry J. Rodger & Stuart R. Wylie, Taking the Community Interest
Line: Decentralisation and Subsidiarity in Competition Law Enforcement, 18 EUR. COMP. L.
REv. 485 (1997).
116. See generally Commission Notice, O.J. C 101/43 (2004).
117. See European Council and EC Commission, Joint Statement of the Council
and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities
(Dec. 10, 2002), http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st15/15435-alen2.pdf
(last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
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with less precise obligations and no apparent sanction. In more
functional terms, political commitment was sought in order to
overcome the perceived shortcomings of the architecture in rela-
tion to consistency, stability and clarity. The ECN is created
under Regulation 1, Recital 15 and Chapter IV. The NCAs and
Commission:
* Inform each other of cases
* Share information (subject to certain limitations)
* Help with investigations
* Coordinate investigations
* Discuss areas of common interest.' 18
An annual meeting of heads of the NCAs and DGComp is
held and there are regular plenaries where matters of policy are
discussed. Working groups are where best practice is ex-
changed." 9 Groups include, e.g., the chief economists, leni-
ency, A82, transition to Regulation 1; procedural variety; and in-
formation and communication within the ECN. A report on
each of these is included in the DGComp Annual Report-and
practices vary as between the groups, with some relying mainly
on their intranet and others having more regular meetings (al-
though it is not clear what "a high level of activity" translates to).
There are then thirteen sectoral subgroups, e.g., professional
services, telecoms, energy, pharmacy, etc. All of these groups
operate in English.
NCAs must inform the Commission of when they decide to
take on a case (the Commission can intervene to take over a
case)1 20 and before they make a formal decision. 12 1 In practice,
the Commission is often approached informally before the legal
requirement to inform is triggered. 122 While a network is in
place, it is very much one where the Commission is at the hub-
118. The ECN was created under Regulation 1, Articles 11, 12, and 13. See Com-
mission Notice, O.J. C 101/43, 44 (2004).
119. See COMPETITION AUTHORITY, supra note 112, at 55; see also COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, at 32 (2006) [here-
inafter 2006 REPORT].
120. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, art. 11(6), O.J. L 1, at 11 (2002).
121. See id. art. 11(3), 11(4), O.J. L 1, at 10 (2002).
122. In its 2006 report, the Commission mentions formal and informal approaches
for advice. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 119, at 32-33. In its 2005 report the Commission
stated that such informal advice constitutes internal correspondence and is confiden-
tial. See Commission of the European Communities, ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 73 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 REPORT].
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as agenda-setter and with the capacity ultimately to remove a
case from an authority if it so decides, provided the authority is
consulted. 123 The Commission's decisions also bind all the na-
tional authorities and cover the entire EU. The Commission, in
its 2005 Annual Report, gave guidance as to when it is likely to
take up a case-prefacing these criteria by encouraging citizens
to use alternative strategies, notably to approach its own NCA or
to go to court-with the Commission and NCAs seeking to en-
courage private actions to supplement public enforcement.
124
The Commission is most likely to act where the matter is likely to
have an effect on the internal market and is particularly com-
plex. The rule of thumb is that if three or more Member States
are affected, the Commission may act.
125
In theory, each and every NCA can deal with any conduct
falling within Articles 81 and 82 provided it affects trade between
Member States, although the objective is that only one authority
will deal with any case. 12  This authority will usually be the first
seized of the case, but following consultation the case can be
reallocated with an emphasis on a timely transfer. 127 They can
refuse to deal with an agreement/conduct already subject to in-
vestigation or decision by another authority, but they are not
obliged to do so. Their decisions do not bind each other, but
the Regulation stipulates that their relationship is one of
mandatory close cooperation that arguably imposes a duty on
them to address whatever difficulties this incomplete legal archi-
tecture may create. 128 The scope of powers and autonomy of the
national authorities is not stipulated and that variety itself cre-
ates the potential for considerable divergence with procedural
variation and different sanctions leading to differences in pre-
dictability, consistency and stability.1 29 Since the Network com-
123. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, recital 17, art. 11(6), O.J. L 1, at 4, 11
(2002).
124. See 2005 REPORT, supra note 122, at 25.
125. See Commission Notice, supra note 116, recital 14, O.J. C 101/43, at 44
(2004).
126. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, recital 18, O.J. L 1, at 4 (2002); see also Silke
Brammer, Concurrent Jurisdiction Under Regulation 1/2003 and the Issue of Case Allocation,
42 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1383, 1385 (2005).
127. See Commission Notice, recitals 6, 7, O.J. C 101/43, at 43 (2004). Three cu-
mulative conditions under which an NCA is deemed well placed to deal with a matter
are set out in paragraph 8 of the Notice. See id. recital 8, O.J. C 101/43, at 44.
128. See Council Regulation No. 1/03, art. 11, O.J. L 1, at 10-11 (2002).
129. See Margaret Bloom, Exchange of Confidential Information Among Members of the
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menced operation up to the end of June 2008, the ECN has
been notified of 886 investigations (of which 159 were Commis-
sion notifications) and of 270 envisaged decisions. 131 Work shar-
ing was discussed in the 2005 report. The Commission noted
that it arose in two scenarios: cartel investigation (flat glass) (the
Commission organized the inspections because of the number
of states involved) and leniency. The second scenario relates to
complaints submitted to more than one authority or to the Com-
mission. The issue of overlap is relatively rare.1"' Thus far there
hasn't been any serious challenge to its functioning. Should a
serious issue arise, there are no mechanisms in the Notice or the
Regulation to deal with them, 132 although the Commission is
well placed to act as broker.
The ECN is seen as a success.' Thus far there hasn't been
any serious challenge to its functioning. Its operation has been
characterized by a "can-do" attitude.'34 In fact, the Commission
in its 2005 Annual report casts the ECN as the primary vehicle
for ensuring the consistent and coherent application of EC com-
petition law and yet, it does so without binding rules on case
allocation, and no rules on the responsibilities of NCAs (other
than that of mandatory close cooperation). It acknowledges the
risk to consistency identified by the OECD1"5 and sees the Net-
work as the answer.
What has happened in EC antitrust law is a fragmentation of
enforcement that may well lead to greater coherence as NCAs
can now enforce EC law rather than only having to apply their
own competition rules which, while mainly based on EC norms,
EU Network of Competition Authorities: Possible Consequences of a Relatively Broad Scope for
Exchange of Confidential Information on National Procedural Law and Antitrust, in EURO-
PEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2002, supra note 25, at 389-404; Maher, supra note 29,
at 223-36; Alan Riley, EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely - Thank
You! Part 2: Between the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation Under Regulation 1, 24 EUR.
CoMP. L. Ruv. 657-72 (2003).
130. See EC Commission Website, Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competi-
tion/ecn/statistics.html (last visited Jul. 28, 2008).
131. See 2005 REPORT, supra note 122, at 72; see generally The Antitrust Source, The
European Competition Network: What It Is and Where It's Going, available at http://www.
abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/05/07/Ju105-ECNBrBag7=28f.pdf.
132. See Brammer, supra note 126, at 1402.
133. For a list of six risks to decentralization see Wilks, supra note 22, at 446. See
also Wilks, supra note 90, at 440-42.
134. See THE ArNTITRUST SOURCE, supra note 131, at 6 (statement of Ray Leonard).
135. See 2005 REPORT, supra note 122, at 72.
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nonetheless carry local differences. Thus, EC competition law
seems to be going against the trend of increasing differentiation
towards more generalized norms. We can cast the competition
law experience as an example of a transformative rivalry where a
system characterized by traditional law forms and centralized
governance is supplemented with one that is institutionally
nested within formal legal norms but operates largely without
them, that is expressly designed to develop a culture of owner-
ship of the rules, and advocates development of best practice in
general and facilitates confidential information exchanges to a
degree not previously possible.' 36 Through the network, further
legal reform and rule formation is discussed, supplementing
other channels. This is a form of instrumental hybridity where
soft law develops existing legal norms. Arguably it is precisely
because the competition sphere was so highly juridified that it is
possible to delegate. Not only does the network lead to policy
change at the EU level, but may provide the impetus for change
at the national level. This has two dimensions: first it is arguable
that the network would not have been possible if Member States
had not largely spontaneously started to adopt the EC model of
competition law in the 1990s. It is perhaps a rare example of
legal transplant from the EU to its Member States without any
legal obligation (other than the negative obligation to do noth-
ing to interfere with the EC rules and their effectiveness). Con-
vergence continues-thanks in part to the effect of the Network.
This can be seen in relation to leniency programs of which there
were three national programs in 2000 and now there are twenty-
five such programs,137 with a commitment by all the Heads of
NCAs to use their best efforts to align their programs (existing
or future) with the model adopted in September 2006.138
CONCLUSION
The governance debates surrounding Lisbon may shed
136. See generally Daniel Reichelt, To What Extent Does the Co-operation Within the Euro-
pean Competition Network Protect the Rights of Undertakings?, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 745
(2005).
137. See Authorities in EU Member States Which Operate a Leniency Programme,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/leniency-programme-nca.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2008).
138. See ECN Model Leniency Programme, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competi-
tion/ecn/modelleniency-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
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some light on our understanding of what has happened in the
competition sphere and the softening of competition law sheds
further light on the interaction of hard and soft law. Soft law
went from being purely complementary to the core of the busi-
ness of competition law enforcement. This can be seen as the
"old" governance having reached its limits and traditional gov-
ernance methods not having the tools to facilitate the brave new
world of modernization. The primary value remains consistency
and coherence of the law and yet, the traditional method of se-
curing it-clear, concise rules-has been eschewed in favor of a
dynamic model without many such rules, but instead a working
method based on cooperation and mutual learning and respect.
The closed nature of the network means its members are small
in number, it is secret, elite and they share a common commit-
ment to the competition regimes. The network acts as a buffer
even against perhaps a more hostile environment at home. Its
technocratic and limited focus also sets it apart from the much
broader policy canvas found in other policy contexts. Finally,
the Commission remains in the driver's seat. The absence of
rules as to how to resolve conflicts leaves it as broker. There is a
hierarchy written into the rules in its favor. The legal nature of
the work of the network also removes it from the hustle and bus-
tle of "real" politics, leaving bigger disputes to be resolved in a
political context where the duty to coordinate is perhaps less
binding.
The network model of fragmented decentered governance
is a form of transformative rivalry where the relationship be-
tween hard law and soft law is transforming our understanding
of hard law-giving it an instrumental edge-that means that
soft law is not seen as a threat to values seen as underpinning
law, but instead as advancing them albeit by different means.
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